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We investigate how different governance arrangements affect risk and return in banks. Using a new 
data set for UK banks over the period 2003-2012, we employ a simultaneous equations framework to 
control for the reciprocal relationship between risk and return. We show that separation of the roles of 
CEO and Chairman increases bank risk without causing a concurrent increase in return. We also find 
that oversight by a Remuneration Committee and Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) lowers the 











from empowering independent NEDs. Overall, our results underline the importance of accounting for 
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1 Introduction 
The institutional systems and protocols that govern a firm have implications for its performance. This is 
especially so in the banking sector where the presence of explicit or implicit deposit guarantee 
exacerbates incentive problems. The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis prompted reforms of bank 
governance, especially in the area of independence of senior management. Hitherto there is scant 
evidence on how these reforms have affected bank performance. We fill this gap by analysing how the 
independence of bank governance structures affect risk and return in UK banks.   
Agency theory argues that incentives are key drivers of the decisions taken by different agents within 
firms, such as the owners, senior management and other employees (Fama, 1980). This theory 
provides foundation to normative recommendations in which independence in the governance structure 
– such as through a Chairman1 separate from the CEO, Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) separate from 
management, and Board Committees with oversight powers – allows shareholders and regulators to 
influence executive managers. An alternative view in the literature holds that the presence in the 
governance structure of decision-making authorities independent from one another may confuse 
decision making (Yang and Zhao, 2014) or cause CEOs to under-focus on risk management because 
others are accountable for it (Rus et al, 2011).  In this view, there can be inefficiencies in which a factor 
that increases risk does not have a compensating effect on return. We contribute to this literature by 
                                                     
1 We use the term “Chairman” rather than the more-inclusive “Chairperson” because “Chairman” is the term used 











testing these theoretical predictions and modelling the simultaneity between risk and return. This 
approach allows us to make inference on risk and return, provided that these two outcomes are 
simultaneously set by banks’ senior management.  
We show that combining the roles of CEO and Chairman lowers risk without affecting return, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis of conflictual overlap in roles but not with the implications of agency 
theory in this context. We also find that the presence of a Remuneration Committee and a higher 
proportion of NEDs on the Board each lower the probability of bank failure. The contrast between the 
effects of empowering an independent Chairman, which our results suggest would increase risk, and 
empowering independent NEDs, that our results show would decrease risk, is very important in the 
context of our study.  Since NEDs are a form of independent oversight and Remuneration Committees 
are tasked to align pay structures with risk and performance, our results relating to these groups of 
agents appear to indicate that independence matters for bank performance, even though our results 
relating to the CEO and Chairman show that other factors, not explicitly addressed by agency theory, 
matter too.  Specifically, our results suggest that empowering different actors within banks might work 
when the conflicting agents are very different (such as the CEO versus a diffuse group like NEDs) but 
that there could be greater potential for confusion of roles when they are both senior individuals (like 
the CEO versus the Chairman). Indeed, the fact that NEDs and a Remuneration Committee affect 
different outcomes from a Joint CEO-Chairman suggests that the workings of governance are complex, 
with the predictions of agency theory being more relevant in some aspects than in others. 
Our simultaneous-equations empirical framework uses return on assets as a measure of bank return 
and loan impairments over gross loans as a measure of realised risk.  These are used because we are 
concerned with risk and return at the operating level. These variables also reflect risk and return in 
banks’ assets portfolios and are available for all banks, including those with no listed securities (mutuals 
and unlisted companies). As a robustness test we use the Z-Score, which captures the probability of 
default of individual banks (Mare et al., 2017). Other literature uses non-performing loans as a 
dependent variable (for example Ghosh, 2015).  However, this variable is unsuitable for use in our 
models because it is a stock measure, whereas returns is a flow measure.   
Our data is a new data set for UK banks over the period 2003-2012, chosen specifically to balance 











collected elements.  We focus on the UK because it has well-defined corporate governance standards 
defining what constitutes, for instance, a CEO, Chairman, and NED (UK Financial Reporting Council, 
2014) and because it has a balanced mix of bank types (see Section III below).  The UK is also one of 
the world’s largest banking centres and it is thus an important object of study for its global relevance. 
As well as their theoretical implications, our empirical findings have important policy implications.  
Whereas governance standards derived from agency theory recommend that separating the roles of 
CEO and Chairman is a suitable policy for bringing additional incentives into play in the control of banks, 
our findings suggest that such separation could have important adverse impacts at the bank level (and 
consequently for wider financial stability).  This is consistent with less-formal, descriptive evidence.  For 
instance, the investigation into the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland (Financial Services Authority, 
2011) makes reference to decisions that amounted to the CEO intruding on the role of the Chairman 
and Board in setting strategy, including in respect of acquisitions, and to the Chairman lacking sufficient 
banking experience to reverse this situation.  Our results show that bank regulatory agencies should 
focus both on differences in incentives and the potential for adverse effects arising from confusion.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarises the literature.  Section 3 describes 
methods and data, Section 4 reports the results and Section 5 discusses conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
 
2 Literature review 
Our study contributes to the literature that analyses the role of corporate governance for bank 
performance. Specifically, we investigate whether different governance structures affect simultaneously 
bank risk and return. Agency theory predicts that bank performance is determined by the incentives of 
the agents. By empowering these agents and aligning their incentives to for instance shareholders, a 
bank can achieve higher risk-adjusted returns. Agents will then take informed decisions on the level of 
risk to achieve an expected return. 
Past literature on the consequences of combining or separating the CEO and Chairman roles underlines 











the relevant literature and report that firm performance is a major factor in determining CEO 
remuneration, suggesting that CEOs may prioritise return over risk management in their decisions.  By 
contrast, Goh and Gupta (2016) report that firm performance is not a determinant of NED or Chairman 
Remuneration in the UK, suggesting that returns may weigh less heavily in the decisions of these 
agents.  By the same token, Mallin et al (2015) provide similar evidence for firms in the UK and Italy.  
This is consistent with the UK Corporate Governance Code (1998, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016), which 
states that NEDs’ pay should not involve share options or other performance-related elements.  
Similarly, Chen and Ebrahim (2018) report that CEO risk-taking increases further when they are under 
threat of turn-over for a sample of US banks. Anginer et al (2018) introduce a further element by arguing 
that in a theoretical baseline condition with no pay structures such as bonuses designed specifically to 
incentivise profit-seeking, CEOs would seek to minimise risk so as to protect their position. Once such 
bonuses exist, CEO preferences reverse and become profit-seeking and risk-tolerant.   
An influential review of corporate governance in UK banks, including remuneration, conducted during 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, concluded that CEO and executive remuneration lacked 
sufficient sensitivity to risk, being mainly profit-based, but did not find the same issue for bank Chairmen 
(Walker, 2009). Related to this, successive iterations of the UK Corporate Governance Code (1998, 
2010, 2012, 2014, 2016) have not required Chairmen (or NEDs or Board Committees) to act as 
representatives of shareholders to anything like the extent presumed in research based on agency 
theory, and UK bank regulation effectively makes Chairmen representatives of regulators and 
customers (Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, 2018 and earlier editions), while bank Chairmen 
are typically members of UK elite society with august reputations and connections to protect 
(Renneboog and Zhao, 2011).  These factors make the incentives of Chairmen more risk averse. 
What this literature shows is that it is reasonable to regard the incentives of the CEO as being strongly 
profit-seeking and those of Chairmen and NEDs as supporting the minimisation of risk more than the 
maximisation of profit. It is true that, in finance and governance theory, NEDs and Chairmen are 
generally seen as representing the interests of shareholders, and thus seeking to maximise risk-
adjusted returns (Mallin, 2014).  However, the findings discussed above make clear that CEOs almost 
always have incentives that are more profit-oriented (and less risk-sensitive) than those of Chairmen, 











Empirical studies with financial services firms as the observational unit have sought to test how 
personal-level incentives play out at the bank level.  Lu and Boateng (2017) report that CEO duality 
increases credit risk exposure in UK banks.  Duru et al (2016) show that not separating the roles of 
CEO and Chairman has adverse effects on a firm’s return on assets, return on sales and return on 
equity, albeit moderated by an independent board. Other empirical studies report the opposite 
conclusions. Pathan (2009) examines the effects of combining the CEO and Chairman roles and finds 
that a dual CEO-Chairman has a negative effect on bank risk.  Akbar et al (2017) analyse the broad UK 
financial services industry (banks plus insurers, fund managers and investment services firms) and 
document that combining the roles of CEO and Chairman lowers risk-taking.  They argue that this 
occurs because more concentrated power decreases risk-taking incentives due to reputational issues 
and employment risks. However, this interpretation may be misleading: they see a joint CEO-Chair as 
essentially a powerful CEO with the incentives agency theory would suggest (to protect insiders by 
lowering risk).  This is at odds with literature we cite above (Šilingienė et al, 2015, Goh and Gupta, 2016 
and Dey et al, 2011) showing that, in the UK, CEO remuneration structures incentivise risk-taking much 
more than the remuneration structures of Chairmen, and that joint CEO-Chairmen have especially high 
pay-based incentives to take risk.   
It has been suggested that conflicting results such as these are context-dependent, with the presence 
of a joint CEO-Chairman having different consequences in different settings.  Tang (2017) reports the 
effect of CEO-Chairman duality in the US Computer Industry as being contingent on the presence or 
absence of a block-holding external director.  Krause et al (2013) argue that the effects of having a joint 
CEO-Chairman are complex, context-dependent and difficult to generalise.  
An important limitation of the body of literature cited above is that it relies on agency theory as its sole 
theoretical underpinning, which implies that differing incentives between different agents within banks 
are the only determinant of outcomes at the bank level.  Empirical results may be more easily interpreted 
if we expand this theoretical paradigm.  For instance, we might also expect the presence of two roles 
at the top of an organisation – the CEO and Chairman – with closely related mandates, and an 
incomplete contract problem where not every scenario where they will have to divide responsibilities is 
foreseeable, to lead to confused overlap between their roles, or to inaccurate perceptions by one of 











of the other.  We might expect this situation to cause managerial inefficiencies, such as increased risk 
without a compensating increase in returns.   
Some literature has considered these possibilities.  Rus et al (2011) argue that the level of accountability 
for specific objectives experienced by leaders such as CEOs is important, indicating that anything which 
dilutes the accountability for risk that CEOs perceive (such as through the perception that an 
independent Chairman is taking care of it) may have important effects.  Yang and Zhao (2014) argue 
that industrial firms with a joint CEO-Chairman have a performance advantage in the aftermath of a 
major change in competitive conditions (the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement), 
strongly suggesting that they gained this advantage by being able to respond more quickly and 
decisively to changing economic conditions.  Brickley et al (1997) likewise argued that separating the 
roles of CEO and Chairman entailed costs that outweighed the advantages in the case of US non-
financial corporations.  In the special case of Vietnam, Pham et al (2015) show that the presence of a 
joint CEO-Chairman leads to superior returns for M&A acquirers.  
Certain practitioner literature likewise argues that sharing power between the CEO and Chairman may 
be unrealistic and may create confusion of roles and responsibilities, with important consequences for 
the firm (Oliver Wyman Delta, 2004).  We advance the extant literature by employing a simultaneous 
equations framework in which we control for the effects of risk and return upon one another.  This is 
key because it enables us to identify situations in which risk decreases but returns do not, contrary to 
predictions founded on agency theory. 
Importantly, our paper is also the first time the “confusion hypothesis” has been examined in the case 
of the banking sector, which has unique features (like the presence of deposit insurance) that alter the 
incentive environment and agents’ behaviour (Forssbaeck, 2011).   
Compared to studies that examine the remuneration-based incentives of CEOs and Chairmen, there 
are no similar studies for the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), another key agent whose independence tends 
to be safeguarded in corporate governance rules.  However, regulation in the UK requires that 
remuneration of control functions is appropriately aligned to risk-taking incentives and that control 
functions are not subject to remuneration-based incentives that could undermine their motivation to limit 










Results in the literature on the effects of having a CRO as a full Board Director may be compared with 
those for an independent Chairman, because both represent the presence of individuals empowered 
independently of the CEO.  Aebi et al (2012) find that a CRO on the Board has a positive impact on 
returns, while Dong et al (2014) show that it has a negative impact on risk.  However, these studies are 
based on narrow research contexts (a crisis period for the former and Chinese banks for the latter) and 
represent the opposite effect of senior-level monitoring from that reported for the Chairman, making 
them difficult to interpret.   
Using the same arguments as used earlier in the case of an independent Chairman, it may be more 
likely that an independent CRO leads to inefficient outcomes because it leads to a confused overlap of 
roles, potentially including weakening the focus of the CEO on risk management.   
In the case of Non-Executive Directors, these individuals form a more diffuse group with no clear 
personal managerial roles, so they may be less likely to cause the CEO confusion over the boundaries 
of his or her role or dilute his or her personal focus on risk.  Therefore, having more NEDs can be 
expected to cause less risk and less return, in the way their personal incentives and the analysis of 
agency theory would suggest.  The effects of NEDs and Committees may be as agency theory predicts, 
while the effects of independent individuals such as the Chairman and CEO may be more complex. 
A high proportion of independent directors on a bank’s Board appears to lead to reduced risk and 
possibly reduced performance.  Analysis from the International Monetary Fund (Brandão-Marques et 
al, 2014) finds that independence at Board level leads to reduced risk, a result that is also found by 
Pathan (2009).  Aebi et al (2012) finds that director independence leads to reduced profitability in a 
crisis period.  A dissenting argument is provided by Anginer et al (2014), which reports that 
independence in the governance structure at Board level leads to increased bank risk-taking. Similarly, 
Anginer et al (2018) suggest that shareholder-friendly corporate governance appears to increase both 
stand-alone and systemic risk because of bank incentives to shift risk onto the financial safety net. 
In summary, our exploration of the literature suggests that the predictions of agency theory are 
necessary but not sufficient to explain governance dynamics in banks.  Other considerations, such as 
confusion of decision-making when agents have overlapping roles, are also important in determining 
how governance affects risk and performance, and are likely to imply that empowering independent 










for different governance structures and a simultaneous-equations framework, we test the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Independence in the governance structure of a bank affects risk and return together, in the same 
direction. 
3 Method and Data 
3.1 Method 
We employ a simultaneous-equation framework, for the first time in the literature on independence in 
bank governance structures.  This is important because, in any setting where there is simultaneity 
between dependent variable Y1 and dependent variable Y2. We statistically model the effect of an 
explanatory variable X1 upon Y1, if X1 also directly affects Y2. If we omit simultaneity from our model, 
we will have confounded a direct effect on Y1 with an indirect effect via the channel of simultaneity. 
Consequently, the OLS estimator of Y1 on X1 will be biased and inconsistent.  Our approach avoids this 
issue. 
The specifications we use are as follows:  
 
𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿. 𝐽𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿. 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿. 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
3
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿. 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟗𝑳. 𝑪𝑻𝑹𝑳𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝒀𝑹𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                       (1) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿. 𝐽𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿. 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿. 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
3
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿. 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿. 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟗𝑳. 𝑪𝑻𝑹𝑳𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝒀𝑹𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                            (2) 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿. 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
3
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿. 𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿. 𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿. 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡












𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿. 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿. 𝐷𝑅
3
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿. 𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿. 𝐶𝑈𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿. 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿. 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟗𝑳. 𝑪𝑻𝑹𝑳𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝒀𝑹𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                           (4) 
 
 
Subscripts i and t represent bank and year, respectively.  The term L. indicates a lag of one year.  The 
β terms are parameters or, when shown in bold, vectors of parameters.  The ε terms are idiosyncratic 
error.  Parameter numbering is separate for each equation and is not cross-referenced in empirical 
tables.  The term Φ represents the Probit transformation.  Equations (1)-(2) are used to estimate direct 
effects of governance variables, while (3)-(4) are used to test for interactions amongst governance 
variables.  Equations (1)-(2) are estimated simultaneously with one another, as are (3)-(4). 
To measure returns, we use Return on Assets (ROA) as a dependent variable because it is a measure 
of bank portfolio performance that is normalised to a measure of bank size.  As a measure of risk, we 
use Loan Impairments as a ratio of gross loans (LI) because it is a pure measure of adverse asset 
outcomes and is again normalised to balance sheet size.  Similar measures of risk and return are used 
in the literature, for instance Aebi et al (2012) uses return on equity while Forrsbaeck (2011) and 
Iannotta et al (2007) use measures of loan impairments normalised to an indicator of bank size.  Other 
literature uses non-performing loans as a dependent variable (Ghosh, 2015; Oliver Wyman, 2015), 
however this would be unsuitable for use in our models that have risk-return simultaneity as an essential 
feature, since non-performing loans are a stock measure, while returns are a flow measure, and the 
simultaneous-equations model should use two flow measures to ensure that we are comparing like-
with-like.   
Our choices of ROA and LI as dependent variables is driven also by the fact that our work is motivated 
by the history of instability in the banking system.  To inform refinements to banking policy and 
regulation, we aim to understand factors which affect outcomes at the bank level, especially bank 
solvency.  That is, we are interested in the operations of banks and the accounting measures they 
report, especially the solvency position of their accounts, and not in effects of bank risk on the wealth 
of shareholders or in any external, market-based measure of bank risk. In addition, we aim to include 











default (Merton, 1974) would imply excluding from mutual banks, which account for 40% of the total 
number of banks in our sample.   
Measures of loan impairments and non-performing loan balances are used by regulators, academics 
and advisors to track levels of stress, at the national and bank-specific levels (Ghosh, 2015, Oliver 
Wyman, 2014 and IMF Financial Stability Reports and associated data releases, April 2011, April 2013 
and November 2016).  It is notable that the data reported in these sources has temporal and spatial 
patterns consistent with economic experience, indicating that it is a reliable measure of realised risk.  In 
the US and UK, for instance, impaired loans were low prior to 2007, rose sharply during the crisis years 
and declined again from 2010.  In Italy and Spain, by contrast, impaired loans continued to rise for 
several years after 2010.   
It could be argued that loan impairments may be flawed as a measure of risk if accounting and audit 
practices are so poor that impairments are not recognised at all.  However, it is not plausible that the 
measure could be flawed to this extent, and the temporal and spatial patterns found in the studies 
outlined above indicate that the loan impairments ratio functions well as an indicator of realised risk.  It 
is possible that the full extent of loan impairments takes time to emerge, but this is addressed partly by 
the fact that our study employs lagged regressors. 
The beginning of section 3.5 explains why variables that affect financial risk and return for banks are 
expected to also influence the probability of bank failure, directly and indirectly.  To test this possibility, 
we also use as dependent variable a measure of combined failure (CF) that takes the value 1 when 
banks become insolvent or participate in a government scheme designed to prevent imminent 
insolvency, zero otherwise. The dependent variable is defined in this way in order to capture all 
outcomes that amount, effectively, to bank failure.  Equation (5) presents this specification: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿. 𝐽𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿. 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿. 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿. 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳. 𝑪𝑻𝑹𝑳𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝒀𝑹𝑫𝒊𝒕)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (5) 
 
In equations (1)-(5), explanatory variables of interest are dictated by hypothesis H1. These consist of 











member (CROB), the ratio of Non-Executive Directors as a proportion of Board size (DR) and the 
presence of a Remuneration committee (REMC).  We also include squares and cubes of DR to allow 
for the possibility that DR has nonlinear effects if increasing numbers of NEDs initially affect decisions 
but further increases have different effects due to making Boards large and unwieldly or diluting 
individual accountability. 
We include a range of controls (CRTLS) encompassing financial and institutional features of banks.  
Specifically, we include exposures of banks to one another (BNK) on the basis that this can transmit 
risk (Tian et al, 2013), the extent of securities holdings (SEC)  as for example in Allen and Jagtiani 
(2000), the extent of fee-earning advisory activity (ADV) as this can affect the risk-return trade-off 
through diversification effects (Pennathur et al, 2012), current deposits as a proportion of total liabilities 
(CDL) as insufficient deposit financing can affect risk and return (King, 2013), the equity ratio (ER) as 
leverage is one of the most basic drivers of risk and return (Atrill and McLaney, 2006 and Valencia, 
2014) and bank size as a ratio of GDP (SIZE) as this has been identified as a driver of risk-taking 
behaviour (Bhagat et al, 2015).   
The choice of equity ratio (statistically equivalent to leverage ratio) as a control variable, rather than 
some ratio of regulatory capital, is made because equity ratio is a well-defined concept, based on 
established accounting standards (Atrill and McLaney, 2006 and International Accounting Standards 
Board, 2015).  Regulatory capital ratios, by contrast, have a denominator (Risk-Weighted Assets, 
RWAs) that is quantified based on bank-internal models (Bank for International Settlements, 2006 and 
2009).  There is evidence of inconsistency in the quantification of RWAs across banks, with the same 
assets attracting very different RWA treatments in different banks (e.g. Ferri and Pesic, 2017; for the 
UK, see Haldane, 2013).   
We include dummy-variable controls for state majority ownership (STATE), mutual ownership (MUT) 
and majority ownership by a foreign parent (FOR), because the literature suggests these have important 
effects on bank risk and return (e.g. Iannotta et al 2007 and 2013 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  We 
likewise use a range of controls reflecting the governance structure because the literature suggests 
governance can have important effects on bank risk and return (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Measures 
used include board size (BRS), the presence of a commercial Director as a full Board member (CDB), 











of the Board who are female (FEM), the proportion of the Board who have no previous financial services 
experience (NEXP), the presence of executive remuneration disclosures (ERD) and average pay 
across all levels of seniority (AP).  These measures were carefully selected to encompass a diverse 
range of aspects of governance. 
To allow for effects that other outcomes of interest to managers and shareholders may have, we control 
for Growth in Total Assets (GTA) and Loan Interest Income (LII).  One rationale for including these as 
controls is that basic accounting (e.g. Atrill and McLaney, 2006) shows that one outcome may affect 
another, for instance if higher LII contributes to higher ROA.  As another rationale, we argue the 
outcomes a bank has experienced in respect of one metric of interest may affect how it pursues other 
outcomes of interest in the succeeding periods.  For instance, if the loan book has experienced faster 
growth in assets, this may affect how it allocates assets, and thus financial outcomes.  
All regressors and bank-specific controls are included at a lag of one year to allow for the possibility 
that effects take one annual accounting cycle to appear and to reinforce the case for exogeneity.  The 
exceptions are ROA and LI, which are modelled as simultaneous and are each included as regressors 
unlagged and at a lag of one year.  This is because the accounting effects of one on the other (Atrill 
and McLaney, 2006) are expected to appear immediately, while the simultaneity predicted by finance 
theory exists in the long run (Jones, 2012). 
A number of important interaction terms are included.  We control for the possibilities that independent 
agents in governance are substitutes or complements for one another.  Specifically we use the term 
cumulative governance (CUMUL) which takes the value 3 if a bank has all three of an independent 
Chairman, CRO on the Board and NEDs being over 50% of the Board.  It takes the value 2 if two of 
these are the case, 1 if only one of them is true and zero if none of them are true.  We use the term 
CRO or Chair (CROC), which takes the value 1 if either an independent Chairman or CRO (or both) is 
present.  We also use the term Low NED (LNED), which takes the value 1 if NEDs are less than half 
the Board, such that they are unable to form a majority vote.  We test these interactions using equations 
that do not also contain the individual terms in the interaction, to avoid severe multicollinearity. 
Finally, to control for external conditions that vary over time but which are identical for all banks, such 
as macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, we use dummy variables representing each year from 











is a business cycle that varies through time (Romer, 2006) and which can affect outcomes for banks 
(Allen and Gale, 1998).  The other part of the rationale is that regulatory conditions vary through time 
and this can also have impacts for banks (Noss and Toffano, 2016).   
The same set of controls is used across dependent variables, because the literature suggests that 
attributes of banks which affect risk also affect performance and because there is no reason for different 
indicators of risk and return to differ in the bank attributes that affect then.  Using a comprehensive set 
of regressors throughout avoids issues with confounding. 
Our multi-equation models are estimated by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM), with the use of two estimators serving as a robustness check.  Compared 
to 2SLS, GMM is more likely to satisfy the relevant moment conditions but can be vulnerable to a weak 
instruments problem.  Models with a binary dependent variable are estimated as Probit models with 
numerical optimisation to maximise the likelihood that parameters fit the data.  These are all standard 
estimators for models of these kinds (Greene, 2012).  Estimates of parameters and their standard errors 
are reported, along with standard diagnostic tests to assess the reliability of these quantities (Greene, 
2012). 
 
3.2 Data  
To test the hypothesis stated in Section 2.1, data was extracted from Bankscope and combined with 
manually-sourced data on governance and ownership.  Bankscope contains data on several hundred 
financial variables, using a standardised format, and encompasses both annual and quarterly data. 
The data we employ relates to the United Kingdom and is at annual frequency for all years from 2003 
to 2012, since quarterly data is severely incomplete.  This covers both a benign economic period (2003-
2007) and a stressed period of roughly equal duration (2007-2012).  We use data relating to the UK for 
two reasons: a) the UK has a well-established corporate governance framework where for example the 
meaning of what constitutes a Chairman or a NED is clear and stable over time, and b) the UK banking 












Without selection by business model (which involves removing from the data entities that are not true 
banks, such as investment managers and brokerages) or by parent / subsidiary status, we obtain data 
on 711 legal entities for the United Kingdom.  We remove firms that are not retail, commercial, corporate, 
investment or universal banks and ensure that only one entity per corporate group (the consolidated 
parent entity in all but two cases) is present in the data.  This reduces the sample to 115 banks and 
total observations for these 115 banks over the 10-year period numbered 762.  In the context of the 
UK, this represents the population at the time. 2 
For each bank we manually collected data from annual reports and the Pillar 3 disclosures required 
under Basel 2 and 3 regulations.  The data collected in this way relate to ownership type, features of 
governance and regulatory permission to use the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach for measuring 
and managing credit risk.  The use of manually-collected data gives us unique information not used in 
other studies.   
The data we use from Bankscope are on an annual, calendar-year basis, with variables presented with 
universal definitions across banks, based on the Fitch Universal format.  For banks that do not have a 
December year end, we have data for the nearest bank year-end to the December year-end.  For our 
analysis, this detail has limited impact as the great majority of the banks in our sample have a December 
year end for financial accounting purposes.3   
                                                     
2 Where banks are established de novo and come into existence during a year, a record is included for them in our 
data for the year in which they come into existence.  Where banks cease to exist during a year due to failure, a 
record is also included for them for that year, but not for subsequent years.  Where banks cease to exist during a 
year due to merger or acquisition, no record is included for them for that year in order to avoid double-counting 
with the new group entity that is thereby created and which is also present in the data set. 
3 Out of 111 entities for which we could obtain annual reports, 85 (77%) had year ends at the end of December 
and 106 (95%) had year ends between the end of September and the end of March.  Since the external economic 
and regulatory conditions that are included in our models (captured through year dummies) tend to be very stable 
from one year to the next and the fundamental characteristics of banks themselves change slowly, a slight 












We record governance data collected from annual reports and pillar III disclosures as the values that 
prevailed for most of the calendar year.  For instance, if a bank had 8 non-executive directors for most 
of the year but lost one of them three months before the calendar year-end, then we record the number 
of NEDs present for the year as 8.  This is possible because banks disclose arrival and departure dates 
for directors during the year.  In this way, performance and impairments accumulated over the year are 
compared with the governance structure that prevailed for most of the year.  This definitional point is 
unlikely to be important for comparisons across banks since the explanatory variables we use are 
remarkably stable over time.   
In cases where a foreign parent has control over a UK branch or subsidiary, the composition of the 
foreign parent’s Board was used as the basis of the governance and ownership data we collected.  A 
separate UK Board was used only where the annual reports of the company state explicitly that it has 
decision-making independence from the parent.  This convention provides further support for the 
argument that governance variables are exogenous: if a characteristic originates with an overseas 
parent entity, it is less likely to be subject to reverse causality in which it is affected by financial 
characteristics of the branch or subsidiary. 
For a few continental European parent entities where there is both a supervisory Board and a 
managerial Board, we include the supervisory Board only in defining variables relating to Board 
composition.  This is because the supervisory Board has oversight over the managerial Board and can 
over-rule its decisions, while the managerial Board is more similar to an Executive Committee in a UK 
corporate governance context.   
Non-Executive Directors are defined in our data as directors who do not have any executive 
responsibilities identified by the annual report.  In applying corporate governance codes and guidelines, 
banks may operate slightly different definitions of non-executive status, such as having no executive 
responsibilities and having had no such responsibilities with the same or a related organisation at any 
time in the past.  Since banks vary in their application of definitions established in governance codes – 
such as in what counts as a ‘related organisation’ – adopting their definitions could lead to inconsistency 
in our data.  We therefore adopt the simpler, more objective standard of simply counting NEDs as 










and Vice / Deputy Chairmen of banks are classified as non-executive if they do not have specific 
identified executive responsibilities and instead serve mainly to oversee the CEO and other executives. 
Variables used in this paper are as shown in Table 1 below.   
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Descriptive statistics confirm that variables were suitable for inclusion in econometric models.  They 
reveal that means, standard deviations and outliers all have economically plausible values.  The 
regressors of interest demonstrate a very high degree of autocorrelation (greater than 0.86 in all cases).  
This supports the argument that institutional features are very stable over time for banks and can be 
treated as exogenous variables that are effectively predetermined.  Possible problems of 
autocorrelation are addressed using clustered standard errors.   
Table 1 shows that, of 760 data points in the data, encompassing 115 unique entities, there is a wide 
range of entity sizes, ranging from balance sheets equivalent to 205% of UK GDP, down to the 
equivalent of 0.0008% of GDP.  The data include international banks, large national banks and building 
societies, banks and building societies covering a region of the UK, and local players with a small 
number of branches.  Business models of entities in the data include universal banking, corporate 
banking and retail banking.  The variable Joint CEO-Chairman takes a value of 1 (indicating the roles 
are combined) for nine percent of the sample and a sufficient number of data points to satisfy the n > 
30 criterion for avoiding effects of influential outliers.  Entities in the data where the roles of CEO and 
Chairman are combined include investment banks, large international banks, UK regional banks, private 
banks and small local banks.  In the majority of cases, the combined status of the CEO and Chairman 
roles exists for only 1-2 years, with exceptional cases where it persists for 4-5 years.  The shorter 
durations work well for our analysis because they imply that our sample contains the same banks in 
both possible states for the variable of interest.  In addition, influential outlier analysis reveals no 
influential outliers in the sample. 
Missing data was imputed by backward replacement in which a missing value is replaced with the value 
at the subsequent time point for the relevant variable and bank or, if this was not possible, replacement 










of the autocorrelation present in the data.  Importantly, no imputation was carried out for dependent 
variables or governance or ownership variables.  Since these are central to the issues being examined, 
results should ideally not be dependent on assumptions made in respect of imputation.  This approach 
means that observation number increases when regressors are dropped for robustness testing, with 
this variation strengthening the argument that results are robust.  A very limited number of extreme 
outliers (no more than 3 observations per model) defined in terms of the value of the dependent variable 
were excluded in estimation to avoid undue influence on parameter estimates. 
 
4 Results 
Using simultaneous equation modelling, we investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
indicators and risk and performance measures in UK banking. We argue that, contrary to the predictions 
of agency theory, the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman lowers bank risk without affecting returns.  By 
contrast, a higher proportion of NEDs and the presence of a Remuneration Committee both lead to 
lower rates of bank failure, a finding more consistent with agency theory, and suggesting that there are 
fundamental differences between the effects of empowering an independent Chairman and the effects 
of empowering independent NEDs.  This contrast is best explained by the literature discussed in Section 
2 on the consequences of separating these roles in terms of confusion and conflictual overlap. 
4.1 Effects of a Joint CEO-Chairman 
We find that the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman leads to lower risk, as measured by loan 
impairments as a ratio of gross loans.  This suggests that the more risk-averse incentives of an 
independent Chairman (compared to the CEO) are not what determine the effects of this independent 
role, especially when we consider the findings of Dey et al (2011) showing that the remuneration of 
Joint CEO-Chairmen is more profit-oriented than that of CEOs.  Instead it suggests that factors beyond 
the incentive differences emphasised by agency theory are important, specifically the confusion and 
dilution of focus that can arise from overlapping roles (Yang and Zhao, 2014 and Rus et al, 2011).   











The estimates in Table 2 suggest that the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman negatively affects 
impairments.  These results are robust to using a GMM estimator with standard errors clustered by 
bank was used as a complement.  Results are reported in Table 3. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman negatively affects loan impairments.  
Table 3 suggests that this explanatory variable also negatively affects returns, however, using different 
specifications4, we find results in line with Table 2 where the variable Joint CEO-Chairman lacks a 
statistically robust effect on returns. 
These empirical results would be surprising if we based our thinking entirely on agency theory, with its 
focus on differing personal incentives, and believed, as regulators appear to, that the most important 
feature of independent Chairmen (aside from basic competence) is the fact that they have weaker pay-
based incentives than CEOs to pursue profit and take risk.  Literature we cite in Section 2 shows that 
regulators are correct to believe that UK bank CEOs, and especially Joint CEO-Chairmen, have strong 
pay-based incentives to take risk whereas independent Chairmen lack such incentives (Šilingienė et al, 
2015, Goh and Gupta, 2016 and Dey et al, 2011). 
Instead of interpreting empirical results in a way that relies on agency theory as its only behavioural 
model, our findings are consistent with the interpretation of the literature that we discuss in Sections 1 
and 2: that agency theory is not the only thing that matters and that the presence of overlapping roles 
at the top of the governance structure can lead to confusion, dilution of focus and sub-optimal outcomes 
for the firm.   
This effect of a Joint CEO-Chairman is not specific to our data – the same finding is reported by for 
example Pathan (2009) using data for the US, although Pathan (2009) does not link the empirical result 
to role overlap and role confusion, or contrast it with different effects of different kinds of independence, 
as we do.   
One way to dismiss our result would be to argue that that independent Chairmen force better recognition 
of impairments, whereas unhindered CEOs are able to conceal them.  If this were so, it would create 
the appearance that a Joint CEO-Chairman lowers risk.  However, it could equally be argued that a 
                                                     











higher ratio of NEDs on the Board would lead to better recognition of impairments since ensuring ‘true 
and fair’ public accounting is a major function of Boards (UK Financial Reporting Council, 2014), and 
that this could create the appearance of an effect on risk contrary to theoretical expectations.  But this 
effect is not evident, so the ‘impairments recognition’ argument is not plausible. 
Another interpretation could be that Joint CEO-Chairmen are remunerated differently from CEOs who 
are not also Chairmen.  Shareholders and Boards might give the former incentives that are less profit-
seeking and less risk-tolerant.  However, Dey et al (2011) report the opposite: that CEO remuneration 
has a higher profit-linked component when the role is combined with that of Chairman.  This study used 
data for corporates in general (not just banks) but it nevertheless suggests that pay does not explain 
our result. 
A more useful behavioural interpretation is provided by Yang and Zhao (2014).  They report that 
separating the roles of CEO and Chairman leads to lower firm performance.  They also report that this 
negative effect is greater in firms with greater complexity and higher information costs (as indicated by 
expenditures on marketing and R&D, the level of intangible assets and investment analysts’ forecasting 
errors).  They suggest that this means that separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman has negative 
effects because of slower and more difficult decision-making. 
Another useful study in interpreting these results is Rus et al (2011).  They find that the gain-seeking 
behaviour of leaders is moderated when accountability for firms’ direction is more concentrated on them.  
It is possible that, when the roles of CEO and Chairman are combined, there is no-one else the CEO 
can assume is exercising oversight over risk, so they are more focused on managing risk.  This effect 
can exist alongside that identified by Yang and Zhao (2014) and, indeed, is complementary to it.  
Therefore, we can conclude that having a Joint CEO-Chairman leads to lower risk because it permits 
clearer decision-making and makes CEOs more focused on managing risk. 
 
4.2 Potential Interactions of the Chairman and CRO 
A surprising feature of the above results is that governance variables do not have as many effects on 
accounting risk and return as expected.  The Director Ratio appears to have no effects at all, even 











(UK Corporate Governance Code 2016).  Meanwhile, estimates of the effects of a low NED ratio (NEDs 
being less than half of the Board) are inconsistent and unreliable.  Having a CRO as a full Board member 
likewise does not appear to have any robustly-detectable effects.  This is again surprising as we 
expected that an independent CRO would have the same effects on risk and/or return as an 
independent Chairman. 
One possible technical interpretation is that these explanatory variables are affected by multicollinearity 
that prevents the detection of significant results.  Variance Inflation Factors for the regressors in 
question are: Low NED: 4.07, CRO Present on Board: 3.41, and Director Ratio: 2.95.  These values 
are not extreme, and are no larger than for other regressors where we detect significant effects, so it is 
not likely that they caused an otherwise highly-significant result to become insignificant.  
To further test the possibility that significant associations are overlooked because of multicollinearity, 
the four regressors mentioned above were used in models with no other regressors, other than year 
dummies as controls.  In this setting VIFs for the regressors were: Director Ratio: 1.92, Low NED: 1.60, 
and CRO Present on Board: 1.02.  However, once again, no significant relationship of these regressors 
with any dependent variable was found (results not shown but available upon request).  Thus, given  
the results from these stripped-down models, it is unlikely that multicollinearity is the reason no 
significant relationships are detected. 
Another possible reason why we do not find some of the effects expected relates to a further gap in the 
relevant empirical literature.  The empirical literature ignores the possibility that internal agents with 
similar incentives to one another (such as the Chairman, NEDs and the CRO) may act as complements 
or substitutes for one another.  For instance, an independent Chairman may be more effective in a 
setting where there are many NEDs on the Board to support his or her decisions.  Alternatively, an 
independent Chairman and a CRO may each have such powers to influence decisions that they are 
redundant, with the presence of either having the same effect as the presence of both. 
We address this possibility by using interaction terms.  Specifically, we use the term cumulative 
governance (CUMUL) which takes the value 3 if a bank has all three of an independent Chairman, CRO 
on the Board and NEDs being over 50% of the Board.  It takes the value 2 if two of these are the case, 
1 if only one of them is true and zero if none of them are true.  We also use the term CRO or Chair 











together, these test the possibilities that features of corporate governance which empower agents with 
similar preferences are either substitutes or complements for one another.  Interaction terms are 
computed after missing-value replacement so that the interaction values are consistent with the post-
replacement values of the underlying terms. 
Estimation results obtained with these interaction terms added to models are as follows (Tables 4 and 
5), with underlying terms in the interactions excluded to avoid severe multicollinearity.  Equations (3) 
and (4) are as explained in Section 3, while (3b) and (4b) are versions of these with regressors dropped 
for robustness testing. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
As in the previous sub-section, because it is necessary to show robustness to a change in estimation 
procedure, a GMM estimator with clustered standard errors was used as a complement to the results 
shown in Table 4.  Results are as follows.  Models are estimated using the same equations (3) and (4) 
as in the preceding table. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Results in Tables 4 and 5 point to one new finding.  There is evidence that the variable CRO or Chair 
has a positive effect on loan impairments.  This is not what we would expect if we believed that only 
personal incentives matter in determining the effects of a given role, such that empowering risk-averse 
agents would lead to lower impairments.  However, it is consistent with the view that overlapping roles 
at the most senior levels lead to confusion and diluted focus.   
Having an independent Chairman (one of the criteria in the variable CRO or Chair) is simply the negation 
of having a Joint CEO-Chairman.  However, the effect reported here is not simply the converse of that 
detected for the variable Joint CEO-Chairman in sub-section 3.1.  If the effects of having or lacking an 
independent Chairman were the only ones present, diluting this variable with a supposedly irrelevant 
term (the presence of an independent CRO) in the interaction variable CRO or Chair would substantially 
reduce the absolute value of parameter magnitudes.  Instead, we find magnitudes of 1.9, 4.5 and 4.6 











values actually increase – suggesting that the presence of a CRO on the Board likely has a similar 
effect to an independent Chairman, although the interaction term is required for the effect to be 
detectable due to substitution effects.  
Observing that the variable CRO or Chair yields significant results, while Cumulative Governance does 
not, suggests that a CRO and Chairman can act as substitutes for one another but that there is no 
sense in which those structures that are considered good governance (independent Chairman, 
independent CRO and many NEDs) are complements of one another.   The latter is consistent with the 
finding that CRO and Chairman are substitutes (rather than complements) and the finding that NEDs 
have different effects from either of these. 
 
4.3 Limited Financial Effects of Non-Executive Directors 
No significant effects of the Director Ratio on financial outcomes at operating level were detected in the 
previous sections.  It appears that the proportion of NEDs on the Board has no effect on banks’ 
accounting outcomes.  Can this be true when our results are considered in the context of the wider 
literature?  If it is true, what does that imply for regulators and policymakers? 
The lack of any financial effect of the Director Ratio must be understood in the context of a literature 
where there is a consensus on the role of Directors who are independent from management, but at 
least one major study that dissents from the consensus.  Analysis from the International Monetary Fund 
(Brandão-Marques et al, 2014) finds that independence at Board level leads to reduced risk.  Likewise, 
Pathan (2009) reports that director independence has a negative impact on bank risk.  By contrast, a 
study by the World Bank (Anginer et al, 2014) reports that independence in the governance structure 
at Board level leads to increased bank risk-taking 
These studies have important limitations.  The World Bank study relied on composite measures of 
independence at the Board level and is thus hard to interpret in terms of the effects of any one, clearly-
defined governance structure.  Meanwhile, the IMF study relied on controls at the country level in a way 
that leaves it particularly vulnerable to bias at the level of bank observational units.   
The study by Pathan (2009) used a different setting from us (the United States) and dependent variables 











our own in terms of methodology: it used panel models with individual variables and a good number of 
controls.  Comparing our results to those of Pathan (2009) suggests that the effects of having more 
NEDs on the Board are context-specific.  The effects are evident for certain indicators and settings but 
not evident for others.  Crucially, one of the ways in which an effect is evident is a higher rate of bank 
failure when NEDs are fewer in number, as reported in sub-section 4.5 below.  So NEDs are effective, 
just not as broadly effective as the literature and corporate governance guidelines would suggest. 
 
4.4 Comparison with Single-Equation Models 
A principal motivation of the multi-equation framework used above is to ensure that results for other 
regressors relating to such features as ownership and governance are unbiased and consistent by 
omitting simultaneity of risk and return.  This being so, it is important to show how parameter estimates 
differ when equations (1) and (2) above are re-estimated using single-equation OLS.  Results obtained 
from such re-estimation are presented in Table 6. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
The lagged positive association of risk and return reported above would be overlooked if single-equation 
models were used.  A number of other important biases would also occur if we relied on single-equation 
models.  First, it would have appeared as if state majority ownership lowers loan impairments, the 
opposite of what the literature on agency theory predicts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Second, we 
would have concluded that mutual ownership has no interesting effects at all, again contrary to relevant 
theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Third, it would have appeared as if Board size positively affects 
both impairments and returns.  Fourth, it would have appeared that a Joint CEO-Chairman has a 
negative effect on both impairments and returns, rather than impairments alone as in Tables 2 and 3.  
Fifth, and finally, it would appear as if the presence of a remuneration committee has a positive effect 
on both returns and impairments.  Each of these biases would alter the interpretation of specific 
empirical results in important ways and, more fundamentally, are supportive of the general contention 
that ignoring simultaneity causes bias.  It is therefore key that future studies on bank ownership and 












4.5 Governance and Bank Failure 
One would expect effects of ownership and governance on bank risk and performance at the accounting 
level to exist alongside effects of the same regressors on bank failure.  Ceteris paribus we would expect 
any characteristic which increases performance to reduce the probability of failure, and any 
characteristic which increases asset risk to increase the probability of failure.  If something reduces 
performance and risk, then it would be expected that the larger of these two effects would be dominant 
in terms of effects on the probability of failure. 
The argument that governance is likely to be important in determining the probability of bank failure is 
reinforced by the work of Liang et al (2016).  In a study using data mining techniques and a data set 
from Taiwan, they show that corporate governance indicators are useful in bankruptcy prediction. 
To determine if governance affects the likelihood of bank failure in the ways we suggest, additional 
models with an indicator of combined failure.  These are new to the literature and the estimation results 
are reported in Table 7.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
The presence of a remuneration committee lowers the probability of bank failure and a higher proportion 
of NEDs on the Board likely has the same effect (although the latter is not fully robust).  This indicates 
that these structures work as intended: ensuring oversight of risk-taking and ensuring that remuneration 
policy is aligned with risk management.   
So, while these features of Board-level governance do not have effects on the measures of bank 
accounting outcomes we use, they clearly must affect other outcomes, such that they have effects on 
the likelihood of bank failure.  This confirms hypotheses H1 and the discussion in Section 2: the 
predictions of agency theory are the main determinant of how aspects of governance and ownership 
affect risk and return in cases where an aspect of governance does not lead to confusion of roles. 
The contrast of this finding with that for Joint CEO-Chairman reveals that a heterogeneity of actors and 











explanation for understanding bank governance.  Our findings can be explained by stating that agency 
theory explains the effects of independent NEDs and independent Committees, but that the confusion 
hypothesis is needed to explain the effects of independent Chairmen. 
Indeed, the observation that independent Chairmen and independent NEDs and independent 
Committees affect different risk outcomes (loan impairments versus bank failure) provides further 
evidence that there is heterogeneity in actors, behaviours and outcomes across different kinds of 
independence in the governance structure. 
5 Conclusions 
Understanding the relationship between corporate governance and bank risk and performance is 
important in terms of giving the right incentives to management for the efficient and cautious running of 
the banking sector.   
Our unique, original contribution is to use simultaneous equation modelling to test the predictions of 
agency theory.  By finding that combining the CEO and Chairman roles lowers risk without robustly 
affecting return, we provide evidence that complexity and confusion play a role. We conclude that 
independence in bank governance is a relevant determinant of bank risk and return, but factors other 
than the incentive conflicts between senior agents within banks matter in determining bank risk and 
return.  
Combining the roles of CEO and Chairman leads to lower loan impairments, likely because of less-
confused decision-making and a clearer accountability for risk management on the CEO.  By contrast, 
oversight by a Remuneration Committee and NEDs leads to a lower rate of bank failure, probably 
because there is no confusion of individual roles in this case, such that the predictions of agency theory 
(different agents pursuing different incentives) are the main force at play. 
The nature of these differing findings show that we must consider constraints beyond those considered 
in agency theory to understand the effects of governance and to design good governance structures.  
Indeed, the fact that different aspects of corporate governance affect different outcomes, even when 










suggests that the effects of corporate governance are not as simple as aligning the incentives of 
different agents. 
Our findings contribute to the policy debate on the role of corporate governance structures in bank risk 
and performance. Our results suggest there should be no reliance on oversight by independent 
Chairmen to restrain risk as this measure is counter-productive.  Instead, banks should rely on other 
oversight structures to rein-in over-mighty CEOs.  The results presented here indicate that having 
sufficient oversight by competent NEDs and Board committees is one viable approach. It follows that 
independence in the governance structure does matter for bank risk and return, but it must be the right 
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Table 1 Variables used and descriptive statistics.   
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Number of “1s” 
/ Total Obs. 
 
ROA Net income over total assets, all multiplied by 
100 
756 0.37 2.25 -33.48 23.93 N/A 
ROE Net income over total equity, all multiplied by 
100 
756 4.42 23.67 -511.35 69.47 N/A 
LII Loan interest income over gross loans, all 
multiplied by 100 
560 6.65 13.58 0.00 258.49 N/A 
GTA Total assets at the current year minus total 
assets at the preceding year, all over total 
assets at the preceding year and then 
multiplied by 100 
643 9.13 25.98 -60.67 208.32 N/A 
LI Loan impairment charge over gross loans, all 
multiplied by 100 
645 0.63 1.90 -17.33 29.91 N/A 
CF Takes a value of 1 if any of the following 
occurred: default or bankruptcy, bailout or 
stress acquisition, asset protection, tier 1 
breach or regulatory capital breach 
760 0.07 0.26 0 1 54 / 760 
STATE Takes a value of 1 if a national government 
owns more than 50% of the shares, and 0 
otherwise 












Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Number of “1s” 
/ Total Obs. 
 
MUT Takes a value of 1 if the bank is owned by 
depositors and / or employees, and 0 
otherwise 
760 0.40 0.49 0 1 305 / 760 
FOR Takes a value of 1 if the bank is owned by a 
parent entity that is based outside the United 
Kingdom, and 0 otherwise 
760 0.29 0.45 0 1 218 / 760 
BRS Number of non-executive directors plus 
number of executive directors 
529 11.53 3.73 0 31 N/A 
DR Proportion of the Board who are Non-
Executive Directors 
528 0.72 0.14 0.27 1 N/A 
REMC Takes value 1 if a Remuneration Committee 
is present, and 0 otherwise 
556 0.89 0.32 0 1 489 / 556 
ERD Takes value 1 if executive remuneration is 
disclosed, and 0 otherwise 
554 0.63 0.48 0 1 349 / 554 
JOINT Takes a value of 1 if the Board Chairman and 
CEO of the bank are the same individual, and 
0 otherwise 
532 0.09 0.28 0 1 43 / 532 
CROB Takes a value of 1 if a Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO) is present as a full director on the 
Board of the bank, and 0 otherwise 












Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Number of “1s” 
/ Total Obs. 
 
CDB Takes a value of 1 if a Commercial Director is 
present as a full director on the Board of the 
bank, and 0 otherwise 
553 0.40 0.49 0 1 216 / 553 
FEM The proportion of the Board who are female 456 0.13 0.08 0 0.5 N/A 
NEXP The proportion of the Board who have not 
previously worked in financial services 
371 0.43 0.23 0 1 N/A 
CROC Takes a value of 1 if either Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO) is present as a full director on the 
Board or there is a Chairman separate from 
the CEO, and 0 otherwise 
760 0.74 0.44 0 1 562 / 760 
CUMUL Takes the value 3 if a bank has all three of an 
independent Chairman, CRO on the Board 
and NEDs being over 50% of the Board.  
Takes the value 2 if two of these are the case, 
and so on 
617 1.90 0.48 0 3 N/A 
LNED Takes a value 1 if NEDs are less than half the 
Board, and 0 otherwise 
 
760 0.07 0.25 0 1 53 / 760 
IRB Takes a value of 1 if the bank has permission 
from the national financial services regulators 
to use the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) 
approach for credit risk measurement and 
management, and 0 otherwise 
754 0.10 0.29 0 1 72 / 754 
EXP Loans and advances to banks over total 
assets 
700 0.19 0.20 9.5E-05 0.99 N/A 














Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Number of “1s” 
/ Total Obs. 
 
ADV Net fees and commissions over total assets 701 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.39 N/A 
ER Equity over total assets 760 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.99 N/A 
CDL Customer current deposits over total liabilities 665 0.56 0.33 0 1.00 N/A 
SIZE Total bank assets over GDP (with total bank 
assets first multiplied by 1,000,000 to reflect 
the fact that it was in millions while GDP was 
in units) 
760 0.07 0.26 7.9E-05 2.05 N/A 
AP Total remuneration expenditure divided by the 
number of employees (in GBP thousands) 
598 150 680 10 1011 
 
N/A 
YRD Year dummies that take the value of 1 for 
each particular year between 2003 and 2012, 
and zero otherwise 
 - -  -  -  -  N/A 
 
 
Note: The mean, standard deviation and outliers for these variables all have economically reasonable values.  Outliers have been checked and relate to cases 











low negative return on equity occurs when there are large losses and these have caused the equity (denominator in the ratio) to become very small.  A few 
extreme outliers are removed in regression analysis to avoid excessive impact on estimates, and influential observations analysis has been carried out to verify 












Table 2 2SLS estimation results for effects of governance in models with simultaneity of risk and return.   
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (1b) (2b) 
 LI ROA LI ROA 
     
L.JOINT -3.992*** -0.341 -4.200** -0.474 
 (1.518) (0.669) (1.997) (0.553) 
L.CROB -0.574 -0.276 -0.271 -0.310 
 (0.641) (0.475) (0.793) (0.438) 
L.DR 141.4 -107.8 0.470 -0.995 
 (113.1) (87.87) (2.107) (1.128) 
L.DR2 -231.2 155.5   
 (166.7) (127.9)   
L.DR3 121.5 -74.00   
 (80.95) (61.29)   
L.REMC -0.114 0.889* 0.0102 0.771* 
 (0.609) (0.531) (0.729) (0.424) 
ROA -4.568***  -5.443**  
 (1.499)  (2.315)  
L.ROA 2.164**  2.864*  
 (1.005)  (1.604)  
LI  -1.721***  -1.605*** 
  (0.664)  (0.514) 
L.LI  0.796*  0.724** 
  (0.442)  (0.345) 
L.BRS 0.0330 0.115** 0.0591 0.105** 
 (0.0590) (0.0565) (0.0688) (0.0443) 
L.CDB -0.512 0.0524 -0.378 -0.0480 
 (0.333) (0.230) (0.371) (0.190) 
L.FEM -1.543 0.0207 -1.121 -0.0116 
 (1.721) (1.293) (2.113) (1.157) 
L.NEXP 0.812 0.556 0.779 0.525 
 (0.823) (0.610) (1.035) (0.561) 
L.LNED 1.202 -2.433* 1.485 -1.439* 
 (1.819) (1.460) (1.841) (0.842) 
L.GTA 0.000432 0.00256 0.00197 0.00196 
 (0.00529) (0.00427) (0.00680) (0.00380) 
L.LII 0.0256 -0.0265* 0.0321 -0.0228* 
 (0.0230) (0.0157) (0.0315) (0.0123) 
L.STATE -1.077 -1.227* 0.260 -1.396** 
 (0.715) (0.654) (1.024) (0.674) 
L.MUT -2.700*** -0.806* -2.816** -0.904** 
 (0.880) (0.462) (1.125) (0.420) 
L.FOR -2.001** -0.845* -2.087** -0.852* 
 (0.774) (0.473) (0.998) (0.437) 
L.ERD -0.290 -0.204 -0.536 -0.156 
 (0.368) (0.278) (0.483) (0.252) 
L.AP -1.321 -1.293 1.384 -1.774 
 (1.871) (1.468) (2.521) (1.467) 
L.IRB -1.692** -0.491 -2.019** -0.482 
 (0.703) (0.370) (1.004) (0.342) 
L.EXP -2.585 3.758* -2.625 3.254** 
 (2.431) (2.197) (3.062) (1.642) 
L.SEC -1.565 2.677 -2.390 2.516* 
 (1.773) (1.732) (2.528) (1.471) 
L.ADV 73.11** -17.53 92.68** -15.65 
 (30.33) (22.52) (47.01) (19.17) 
L.ER -30.40 35.28* -40.97 31.72** 











L.CDL 1.649 -1.058 1.916 -0.846 
 (1.033) (0.791) (1.387) (0.603) 
L.SIZE 0.898 -0.271 0.794 -0.202 
 (0.717) (0.492) (0.876) (0.426) 
Constant -23.31 22.01 4.152 -1.507 
 (23.97) (18.75) (2.939) (1.425) 
     
Observations 297 297 297 297 
VIFs 1.32-7.36 1.32-7.47 1.30-7.23 1.30-7.35 
F statistic 9.49 3.94 7.07 4.83 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F aux reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Hall-Pagan 0.011 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in the main text.  Where two equations are estimated 
simultaneously they are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated 
at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using two-stage least 
squares.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  
Classical standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using Hall-Pagan, Breusch-Pagan and 
system tests shows the presence of non-spherical error variance, such that this work is complemented 
by GMM estimation with clustered standard errors (next results table).  VIFs vary from 1.30 to 7.47 but 
this has not prevented detection of significant relationships or caused sign reversal (shown using 
smaller sets of regressors).  VIF estimates exclude powers of the director ratio.  Auxiliary regression 
using functions of residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of mis-specification for 
any dependent variable.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained 
under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F aux reg is the probability of 
obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of functions of 
residuals on regressors (a test for mis-specification) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary 
regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of mis-specification; results 
not shown.)  Pr> Breusch-Pagan and Pr>Hall-Pagan are probabilities of obtaining test statistics at least 














Table 3 GMM estimation results for effects of governance in models with simultaneity of risk and return.   





   
   
L.JOINT -1.569** -0.976** 
 (0.719) (0.482) 
L.CROB -0.451* -0.266* 
 (0.232) (0.145) 
L.DR 1.844 8.455 
 (43.05) (23.71) 
L.DR2 -15.71 -19.75 
 (63.18) (34.56) 
L.DR3 12.68 12.41 
 (30.75) (16.71) 
L.REMC 0.499** 0.219* 
 (0.240) (0.129) 
ROA -1.838***  
 (0.132)  
L.ROA 0.300***  
 (0.0841)  
LI  -0.512*** 
  (0.0274) 
L.LI  0.0162 
  (0.0417) 
L.BRS 0.0692*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0147) 
L.CDB -0.215* -0.129* 
 (0.114) (0.0740) 
L.FEM -0.968** -0.758** 
 (0.491) (0.306) 
L.NEXP 0.669** 0.422** 
 (0.272) (0.175) 
L.LNED -1.253** -0.509 
 (0.595) (0.360) 
L.GTA -0.000273 0.000116 
 (0.00256) (0.00142) 
L.LII -0.0118* -0.00235 
 (0.00652) (0.00308) 
L.STATE -1.019* -0.541* 
 (0.585) (0.293) 
L.MUT -1.485*** -0.869*** 
 (0.384) (0.209) 
L.FOR -1.142** -0.715*** 
 (0.494) (0.257) 
L.ERD -0.240 -0.133 
 (0.165) (0.0879) 
L.AP -1.302 -0.578 
 (0.953) (0.488) 
L.IRB -0.687*** -0.428*** 
 (0.242) (0.145) 
L.EXP 1.203 0.259 
 (0.907) (0.537) 
L.SEC 0.714 0.232 
 (0.747) (0.400) 
L.ADV 26.70*** 19.71*** 
 (5.738) (2.617) 











 (2.784) (1.230) 
L.CDL 0.00385 0.176 
 (0.307) (0.178) 
L.SIZE 0.192 0.0907 
 (0.265) (0.145) 
Constant 2.423 -0.106 
 (9.474) (5.260) 
   
Observations 299 299 
VIFs 1.29-7.36 1.32-7.47 
GMM criterion Q(b) 1.02 x e-17 1.97 x e-19 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as in Table 2.  The two equations are estimated simultaneously and so 
are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of columns 
and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the generalised method of moments.  
Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses, as a means to address the assumed presence of non-spherical 
error variance.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.29 to 7.47, but this has not prevented the 
detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using shorter equations).  Auxiliary 
regression using functions of residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of mis-
specification for any dependent variable.  Pr>F aux reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at 
least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of functions of residuals on regressors (a test 
for mis-specification) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  











Table 4 2SLS estimation results for interactions amongst governance terms in models with simultaneity 
of risk and return.   
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (3) (4) (3b) (4b) 
 LI ROA LI ROA 
     
L.DR 121.0 -103.2 1.366 -0.900 
 (114.7) (80.34) (2.224) (1.074) 
L.DR2 -201.7 148.6   
 (168.9) (116.4)   
L.DR3 108.3 -70.74   
 (82.25) (55.68)   
L.LNED 1.239 -2.722* 1.886 -1.694* 
 (2.154) (1.544) (2.249) (0.958) 
L.CUMUL -0.410 -0.292 -0.140 -0.295 
 (0.674) (0.466) (0.826) (0.437) 
L.CROC 4.594** 0.644 4.499** 0.764 
 (1.864) (0.792) (2.244) (0.692) 
L.REMC -0.126 0.877* -0.000684 0.778* 
 (0.655) (0.511) (0.767) (0.425) 
ROA -4.828***  -5.662**  
 (1.711)  (2.519)  
L.ROA 2.359**  3.026*  
 (1.153)  (1.748)  
LI  -1.706***  -1.615*** 
  (0.631)  (0.514) 
L.LI  0.785*  0.732** 
  (0.419)  (0.345) 
L.BRS 0.0113 0.116** 0.0435 0.104** 
 (0.0664) (0.0564) (0.0730) (0.0444) 
L.FEM -1.804 0.0317 -1.291 -0.0247 
 (1.870) (1.281) (2.224) (1.163) 
L.NEXP 1.112 0.527 1.002 0.552 
 (0.898) (0.587) (1.087) (0.553) 
L.GTA -0.000214 0.00259 0.00145 0.00190 
 (0.00563) (0.00423) (0.00706) (0.00381) 
L.LII 0.0281 -0.0261* 0.0343 -0.0230* 
 (0.0255) (0.0151) (0.0339) (0.0123) 
L.STATE -1.225 -1.205* 0.151 -1.426** 
 (0.767) (0.623) (1.039) (0.664) 
L.MUT -2.681*** -0.819* -2.824** -0.895** 
 (0.938) (0.452) (1.182) (0.421) 
L.FOR -2.093** -0.841* -2.163** -0.856* 
 (0.851) (0.467) (1.064) (0.440) 
L.ERD -0.356 -0.198 -0.587 -0.160 
 (0.396) (0.272) (0.512) (0.253) 
L.AP -1.404 -1.279 1.315 -1.810 
 (2.008) (1.443) (2.627) (1.465) 
L.IRB -1.779** -0.491 -2.093* -0.482 
 (0.779) (0.366) (1.077) (0.343) 
L.EXP -2.666 3.692* -2.705 3.297** 
 (2.635) (2.072) (3.241) (1.637) 
L.SEC -1.403 2.612 -2.270 2.574* 
 (1.855) (1.618) (2.606) (1.454) 
L.ADV 74.35** -16.80 93.93* -16.30 
 (32.98) (21.12) (49.79) (19.01) 
L.ER -33.22 34.79* -43.43 32.04** 
 (23.35) (18.22) (33.67) (14.85) 











 (1.157) (0.760) (1.503) (0.606) 
L.SIZE 1.056 -0.274 0.911 -0.196 
 (0.802) (0.488) (0.940) (0.428) 
Constant -22.71 21.05 -0.656 -1.798 
 (25.40) (17.65) (2.420) (1.435) 
     
Observations 297 297 297 297 
VIFs 1.33-7.30 1.32-7.51 1.33-7.18 1.32-7.29 
F statistic 8.44 4.08 6.59 4.83 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F aux reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Hall-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in the main text.  Where two equations are estimated 
simultaneously they are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated 
at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using two-stage least 
squares.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  
Classical standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using Hall-Pagan, Breusch-Pagan and 
system tests shows the presence of non-spherical error variance, such that the next results table uses 
GMM with clustered standard errors as a complement.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.32 to 
7.51, but this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused any reversals of sign 
(shown using shorter equations).  VIFs for powers of the director ratio were excluded.  Auxiliary 
regression using functions of residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of mis-
specification for any dependent variable.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as 
was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F aux reg is the 
probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of 
functions of residuals on regressors (a test for mis-specification) under the null hypothesis that the 
auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of mis-
specification; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan and Pr>Hall-Pagan are probabilities of obtaining 












Table 5 GMM estimation results for effects of governance interactions in models with simultaneity of 
risk and return.   
 Model 1 
 (3) (4) 
 LI ROA 
   
L.DR -11.82 0.565 
 (40.37) (21.93) 
L.DR2 4.610 -8.020 
 (59.23) (31.88) 
L.DR3 3.086 6.888 
 (28.94) (15.46) 
L.LNED -1.550** -0.674 
 (0.727) (0.455) 
L.CUMUL -0.376* -0.222 
 (0.215) (0.135) 
L.CROC 1.920** 1.189** 
 (0.790) (0.533) 
ROA -1.832***  
 (0.133)  
L.ROA 0.307***  
 (0.0867)  
LI  -0.512*** 
  (0.0274) 
L.LI  0.0185 
  (0.0421) 
L.BRS 0.0620*** 0.0342** 
 (0.0234) (0.0140) 
L.FEM -1.034** -0.807** 
 (0.500) (0.322) 
L.NEXP 0.775*** 0.489*** 
 (0.273) (0.186) 
L.GTA -0.000555 -3.30e-05 
 (0.00250) (0.00139) 
L.LII -0.0123* -0.00245 
 (0.00633) (0.00297) 
L.STATE -1.070* -0.572* 
 (0.608) (0.305) 
L.MUT -1.423*** -0.835*** 
 (0.385) (0.208) 
L.FOR -1.137** -0.717*** 
 (0.504) (0.264) 
L.REMC 0.515** 0.226* 
 (0.229) (0.125) 
L.ERD -0.262 -0.146 
 (0.171) (0.0943) 
L.AP -1.320 -0.585 
 (0.985) (0.504) 
L.IRB -0.680*** -0.427*** 
 (0.245) (0.148) 
L.EXP 1.327 0.315 
 (0.886) (0.524) 
L.SEC 0.864 0.316 
 (0.760) (0.403) 
L.ADV 25.33*** 19.10*** 
 (5.698) (2.735) 
L.ER 6.863** 0.884 
 (2.753) (1.210) 











 (0.307) (0.181) 
L.SIZE 0.228 0.112 
 (0.276) (0.154) 
Constant 4.006 0.740 
 (9.294) (5.139) 
   
Observations 299 299 
VIFs 1.33-7.18 1.32-7.29 
GMM criterion Q(b) 2.00 x e-17 3.24 x e-19 
Pr > F aux reg >0.999 >0.999 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as in Table 4.  The two equations are estimated simultaneously and are 
shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of columns 
and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the generalised method of moments.  
Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses.  The presence of non-sphericity is assumed, such that clustered 
standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.33 to 7.29, but this has not 
prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using shorter 
equations with less multicollinearity).  VIFs for powers of the director ratio are excluded.  Auxiliary 
regression using functions of residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of mis-
specification for any dependent variable.  Pr>F aux reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at 
least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of functions of residuals on regressors (a test 
for mis-specification) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  











Table 6 Estimation results for models of ROA and loan impairments using single-equation OLS. 
 (1) (2) 
 LI ROA 
   
ROA -1.372***  
 (0.196)  
L.ROA 0.0758  
 (0.159)  
LI  -0.397*** 
  (0.0526) 
L.LI  -0.0488 
  (0.0385) 
L.GTA -0.00236 -0.000503 
 (0.00393) (0.00171) 
L.LII -0.0174** -0.000109 
 (0.00842) (0.00286) 
L.STATE -0.878* -0.228 
 (0.476) (0.293) 
L.MUT -1.387 -0.910 
 (1.342) (0.845) 
L.FOR -1.246*** -0.765*** 
 (0.443) (0.280) 
L.BRS 0.0908*** 0.0443** 
 (0.0231) (0.0198) 
L.DR 0.180 -0.138 
 (0.622) (0.405) 
L.REMC 0.693** 0.218* 
 (0.269) (0.129) 
L.ERD -0.279 -0.175 
 (0.188) (0.106) 
L.AP -0.730 0.137 
 (0.927) (0.647) 
L.JOINT -1.157*** -0.987* 
 (0.429) (0.502) 
L.CROB -0.358 -0.181 
 (0.300) (0.161) 
L.CDB -0.0304 -0.0864 
 (0.0975) (0.0795) 
L.FEM -0.202 -0.636* 
 (0.563) (0.344) 
L.NEXP 0.683** 0.372* 
 (0.276) (0.193) 
L.IRB -0.638** -0.458*** 
 (0.281) (0.168) 
L.EXP 1.738** -0.0180 
 (0.774) (0.437) 
L.SEC 0.793 -0.167 
 (0.777) (0.325) 
L.ADV 14.22** 24.03*** 
 (5.665) (3.627) 
L.ER 12.74*** -2.722 
 (3.431) (2.231) 
L.CDL -0.325 0.291 
 (0.263) (0.191) 
L.SIZE 0.00187 0.0375 
 (0.251) (0.154) 
Constant -0.482 0.685 











   
Observations 303 297 
R-squared 0.884 0.852 
VIFs 1.24-7.67 1.29-7.48 
F statistic 795.4 40.0 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 
F (aux reg) 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F aux reg >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in the main text.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using OLS.  Estimated parameter 
values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using the Breusch-Pagan test reveals the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, such that clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs vary from 1.24 to 7.48, but this 
has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversal (shown by taking 
smaller sets of regressors).  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained 
under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F aux reg is the probability of 
obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of functions of 
residuals on regressors (a test for mis-specification) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary 
regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of mis-specification; results 
not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme as that 












Table 7 Probit estimation results for governance as a determinant of bank failure.   
 (5) (5b) (5c) 
 CF CF CF 
    
L.JOINT 0.398 0.889 -0.0881 
 (0.828) (0.547) (0.417) 
L.CROB -0.349 -0.284 0.460 
 (0.874) (0.565) (0.593) 
L.DR -9.247*** -3.317 -1.118 
 (3.522) (2.136) (1.280) 
L.REMC -2.808*** -0.985** -0.737** 
 (0.743) (0.497) (0.329) 
L.GGL 0.00714   
 (0.00550)   
L.GTA 0.0233***   
 (0.00853)   
L.LI -0.111   
 (0.435)   
L.ROA 0.0560   
 (0.303)   
L.ROE -0.0221***   
 (0.00610)   
L.STATE 8.760*** 2.061*** 1.172*** 
 (1.827) (0.694) (0.407) 
L.MUT 0.998 -0.736 0.192 
 (1.349) (0.639) (0.478) 
L.FOR 5.887*** 1.176** 0.913** 
 (1.579) (0.592) (0.425) 
L.BRS 0.0832 0.0422 0.0178 
 (0.103) (0.0694) (0.0498) 
L.ERD 3.731*** 0.808 0.577 
 (0.910) (0.559) (0.397) 
L.AP -5.424 -3.572 0.0313 
 (4.198) (2.739) (0.0694) 
L.CDB -0.842** -0.505* -0.109 
 (0.360) (0.300) (0.272) 
L.FEM 2.664 -1.148 -0.822 
 (3.035) (2.394) (1.914) 
L.NEXP 5.794*** 2.211** 0.478 
 (1.609) (0.985) (0.709) 
L.IRB -5.956*** 0.268 0.0678 
 (1.602) (0.492) (0.425) 
L.EXP -5.784*** -2.188*  
 (1.436) (1.217)  
L.SEC -7.575*** -4.444**  
 (2.462) (1.982)  
L.ADV -73.17 -83.80**  
 (52.53) (34.92)  
L.ER 5.221 2.362  
 (10.08) (1.710)  
L.CDL 0.138 -0.818  











L.SIZE 1.718* 0.0362  
 (0.894) (0.683)  
Constant 0.941 2.264 -1.063 
 (2.042) (1.428) (0.803) 
    
Observations 294 384 406 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.591 0.376 0.235 
VIFs (these regressors) 1.28 – 7.3 1.27 – 6.23 1.18 – 3.15 
Wald Chi2 2225.7 463.7 422.0 
Pr > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr < Smith-Blundell  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
    
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as in section 2.1.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of columns 
and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using maximum likelihood with numerical 
optimisation.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses and are used to address the presumed presence of non-
spherical error variance.  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained 
under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr<Smith-Blundell is the 
probability of obtaining a Smith-Blundell statistic at least as small as was obtained under the null that 
regressors are endogenous.  
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